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Executive summary | v 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
• On 1 January 2016, the Irish minimum wage (MW) increased from €8.65 to
€9.15 per hour, an increase of approximately 6 per cent. Using data from the
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for the years 2015 and 2016,
we estimate the effect of the increase in the minimum wage on the hours
worked and likelihood of job loss among low paid workers using a difference-
in-differences estimator.
• We generate a treatment group of MW workers and a control group
consisting of higher paid non-MW workers using wage decile and hours
worked data. Individuals in the treatment group possess characteristics which
have been shown in previous research to be associated with minimum wage
workers; the treatment group contains a relatively high proportion of
females, people with low levels of education, non-Irish nationals, services
sector workers, part-time workers and young people. As expected, individuals
in the treatment group are concentrated in low wage deciles, whereas
individuals in the control group are concentrated in higher wage deciles.
• The QNHS data contain hours and decile information on 33,760 employees,
of which we can allocate 28,511 (84 per cent) to either a treatment or control
group. Due to data constraints, we cannot allocate 5,249 workers (16 per
cent of the sample) as there is too much uncertainty relating to their
minimum wage status. This uncertainty relates to the fact that we are
working with wage decile data as opposed to precise wage values. A relatively
large proportion of these unassignable employees work low hours. This
means that the sample of employees used in this study may not precisely
reflect the hours distribution of the full population of workers in Ireland.
• The results indicate that the increase in the minimum wage had a negative
and statistically significant effect on the hours worked of minimum wage
workers. This was primarily driven by the large hours effect for minimum
wage workers on temporary contracts who experienced a weekly reduction
of approximately 3.5 hours.
• Our analysis indicates that the results did not occur as part of a general
downward trend in hours worked by MW workers in the Irish labour market
over time. When the same tests were carried out using data for preceding
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years for which no change in the minimum wage rate occurred, no effect was 
detected. 
• Further analysis indicates that the incidence of part-time (PT) employment
increased by approximately three percentage points more in the treatment
group (MW workers) compared to the control group (non-MW workers)
following the increase in the MW. The increase in the incidence of PT
employment was approximately 15 percentage points higher among
temporary minimum wage workers relative to non-minimum wage
temporary workers.
• Descriptive analysis reveals that while the incidence of involuntary PT work
(could not find a FT job) fell in both the control and treatment groups
between 2015 and 2016, the absolute decline was higher in magnitude in the
treatment group compared to the control group.
• We cannot discount the possibility that incentive effects, whereby more
individuals were choosing to work part-time by virtue of the increase in the
minimum wage, were a factor in explaining the observed reduction in
average hours worked among minimum wage workers following the increase
in the rate.
• Both the descriptive and econometric evidence points to some volatility over
time in the rate of job loss among low waged and minimum wage workers,
with no consistent evidence that the increase in the NMW rate in 2016
caused an increase in the proportions of such workers becoming unemployed
or inactive.
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On 1 January 2016, following recommendations from the Irish Low Pay 
Commission, the Irish minimum wage increased from €8.65 to €9.15 per hour, an 
increase of approximately 6 per cent. In making their recommendations, the Low 
Pay Commission took into account the broader economic conditions within the 
Irish labour market at the time, including the strong economic recovery, growing 
employment and average wage increases across the economy as a whole. In the 
year to Quarter 1, 2016, Average Hourly Earnings increased by 0.7 per cent (Low 
Pay Commission, 2016). The corresponding wage increases in the wholesale and 
retail and hospitality sectors, which typically have a high incidence of minimum 
wage employment, were 1.7 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively. While the 
increase in the minimum wage, at 6 per cent, was higher than the average wage 
increases across the economy, it is important to note that, prior to this increase, 
the minimum wage in Ireland had remained relatively unchanged for the previous 
nine years.1  
 
Using data from the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for the years 
2015 and 2016, we estimate the effect of the increase in the minimum wage on 
both the hours worked and likelihood of job loss among minimum wage workers 
using a difference-in-differences estimator. We find that the increase in the 
minimum wage had a negative and statistically significant impact on the hours 
worked of low paid workers, with a weekly reduction of approximately one hour. 
We split the sample based on the type of contract, temporary or permanent, and 
find a relatively large impact for temporary workers in the order of 3.5 hours per 
week. However, further examination of the data reveals that at least some of the 
observed effect may be attributed to an increase in voluntary PT employment 
among minimum wage workers, suggesting that the decline in average hours 
among the treatment group may have been driven, at least to some extent, by an 
increase in the incentive to work part-time following the rate rise. Our results are 
robust to both placebo tests for years where no change in the MW rate occurred 
and various alternative specifications. We do not find evidence that the increase 




                                                          
 
1  The previous national minimum wage had been in place since July 2007. There was a temporary reduction in this rate 
to €7.65 per hour from February to July 2011. 
2 | Estimating the effect of an increase in the minimum wage 
 
In the absence of precise wage data in the QNHS, we use information relating to a 
person’s wage band and the number of hours they usually work in order to 
evaluate whether they are minimum wage workers. The response rate for the 
decile question is relatively low. Despite this, we are left with a sample of 33,760 
employees for which hours and decile information exists. Of this sample, we can 
allocate 28,511 (84 per cent) to either a treatment or control group using our 
assignment mechanism which is based on a person’s decile and hours worked 
data. However, due to data constraints, which are outlined in detail in Section 3, 
our estimator focuses on the impact of the change on minimum wage employees 
working in excess of 14 hours per week, which, according to CSO (2017), accounts 
for approximately 80 per cent of minimum wage workers.2 Therefore, while clear 
data limitations exist in relation to Irish wage data, the results in this paper 
represent the best evidence available, given these data constraints, on the impact 
of changes to the minimum wage. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.1 we outline 
some of the main findings from the minimum wage literature relating to 
employment and hours effects of minimum wage changes. In Section 2 we 
describe the data and in Section 3 we give a detailed explanation of the strategy 
used to identify minimum wage from non-minimum wage workers. Section 4 
presents some broad descriptive statistics relating to the average hours worked 
of minimum wage and non-minimum wage workers. Section 5 explains the 
difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology we use in the paper and Section 6 
presents the results relating to the effect of the minimum wage on hours worked. 
In Section 7 we show results relating to the employment effects of the minimum 
wage change. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
1.1 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Before examining the empirical evidence on the effects of minimum wage 
changes, it is useful to briefly consider the predicted effects from the two broad 
theoretical models of the labour market which underpin minimum wage analyses. 
The model of a perfectly competitive labour market predicts that a binding 
minimum wage, which is a minimum wage above the market clearing wage, will 
lead to negative employment effects. This is as a result of labour demand falling 
short of supply due to the higher wage. It is important to note that employment 
effects can manifest themselves in two ways, either at the extensive margin, with 
a reduction in the number of workers, and/or at the intensive margin, with a 
reduction in hours worked (Brown, 1999). However, in the monopsony model, 
there is one employer who has a degree of market power which allows them to 
keep wages below the perfectly competitive wage rate. If a minimum wage is set 
 
                                                          
 
2  See CSO (2017) for distribution of MW workers by hours worked.  
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that is above the monopsony wage rate, but lower than (or equal to) the 
perfectly competitive wage, then the monopsony model predicts an increase in 
employment. Manning (2003) argues that monopsony may be more relevant in 
modern labour markets.  
There exists a vast literature examining the effect of minimum wage changes on 
employment outcomes, however the results are mixed. Some recent studies 
which find no discernible employment effects include Dolton et al. (2015), Hirsch 
et al. (2015) and Baek and Park (2016). However, others have found negative 
employment effects associated with minimum wage increases especially among 
certain segments of the population. Dickens et al. (2015) suggest that the reason 
the literature often finds no employment effects is because previous work did not 
focus on vulnerable groups. Dickens et al. (2015) study one of the most 
vulnerable groups, part-time females, and find that the introduction and uprating 
of the minimum wage in the UK is associated with negative employment effects 
for this group of workers. Liu et al. (2016) find negative employment effects for 
the youngest workers in the US, namely those aged 18 and under, with no 
significant effect for 19-24 year olds. Similarly, Gorry and Jackson (2017), using US 
data, find that increases in the minimum wage can lead to increases in youth 
unemployment. While the minimum wage literature can often provide conflicting 
results, several surveys and meta-analyses of the recent literature conclude that 
the weight of evidence point to no, or very little, negative employment effects 
associated with minimum wages (see, e.g., Schmitt 2015; Doucouliagos and 
Stanley, 2009; De Linde Leonard et al., 2014). 
A separate strand of the literature addresses whether the minimum wage is an 
effective policy tool for tackling inequality and poverty. Again, there are mixed 
results. Autor et al. (2016) and Dolton et al. (2010) find that a minimum wage can 
reduce inequality in the lower half of the wage distribution for the US and the UK 
respectively. Garnero et al. (2015) find that statutory minimum wage rates in 
Europe are associated with lower levels of wage inequality. However, MaCurdy 
(2015) and Logue and Callan (2016) find that minimum wages are inefficient for 
boosting the incomes of poor families, as a relatively high percentage of the 
earnings benefit goes to families in the top half of the income distribution.  
The literature on the impact of the minimum wage on hours worked is more 
limited than that relating to employment. Nonetheless, several studies exist and, 
again, as is typical with minimum wage studies, the results are mixed. Some 
evidence suggests a reduction in hours of minimum wage and low paid workers 
as a result of the introduction and uprating of the minimum wage (see, e.g., 
Stewart and Swaffield, 2008; Metcalf, 2008; Couch and Wittenburg, 2001; 
Neumark and Wacsher, 2008; Belman et al., 2015). Neumark and Wacsher (2008) 
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suggest that when reacting to changes in the minimum wage, employers may 
adjust the level of labour inputs by reducing the total number of hours worked 
across all minimum wage employees rather than making specific workers 
redundant. Metcalf (2008) also provides useful insights into the practicalities of 
hours adjustments in firms as a result of minimum changes. Citing oral evidence 
given to the UK Low Pay Commission by the British Retail Consortium and the 
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW), Metcalf (2008) 
highlights that for one major retailer, aggregate hours allocation is based on 
predicted turnover. Managers are allocated a fixed percentage of that turnover 
for the wage bill and therefore an uprating of the minimum wage will lead 
managers to look closely at potential hours adjustments. However, other 
research finds little to no effect on hours worked as a result of minimum wage 
changes (see, e.g., Zavodny, 2000; Skedinger, 2015; Dolton et al., 2010). 
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Our central problem in attempting to measure the impact of changes in the 
national minimum wage (NMW) is that we have no reliable earnings data for the 
period. The primary source of contemporaneous earnings information for Ireland 
has been the National Employment Surveys, however this series was 
discontinued in 2010 and has not been replaced. The only other reliable source of 
income information remaining for Ireland is EU-SILC, however no data are 
currently available beyond 2015 and, in addition, the Irish sample size is relatively 
small. For our analysis we use data from the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(QNHS) for all quarters in 2015 and 2016. The QNHS data are collected 
continuously throughout the year and the QNHS is the official data source for 
producing statistics relating to the labour force in Ireland. We use annual, as 
opposed to quarterly datasets, as they average out seasonal variation and 
generate larger sample sizes. In addition to information relating to employment 
and labour force status, the dataset contains demographic and human capital 
related variables such as age, sex and education. However, there is no detailed 
information on a person’s income, which poses a significant challenge for this 
study as we aim to separate minimum wage from non-minimum wage workers. 
While exact income data are not included, the dataset does categorise individuals 
into wage deciles for a subset of respondents, based on monthly take home pay, 
and we know the bands (in Euro) corresponding to each decile. This enables us to 
distinguish individuals likely to be impacted by the national minimum wage 
(NMW) change both before and after its introduction, thereby allowing us to 
measure the impact of the increase in the NMW on the number of hours worked 
and on employment. Nevertheless, the approach is not without its limitations, 
specifically, the broad range of the lowest decile wage band does not allow us to 
accurately identify minimum wage employees working less than 15 hours per 
week.  
 
We began our inspection of the data by examining both the completeness and 
adequacy of our two key variables, i.e., income decile and hours worked. With 
respect to income decile there is a lot of missing decile data; specifically of the 
124,875 employees recorded in 2015 and 2016 in the QNHS, 89,810 did not 
provide an answer to this question. In the QNHS, a person’s information can be 
captured directly from the person themselves or, alternatively, via another 
member of the household (known as a proxy response). However, proxy 
responses are not permitted for the income decile questions and this explains 
most of the missing information. Of the 89,810 cases with no decile data, 64,442, 
or just over 70 per cent, are due to proxy interviews. The fact that we have 
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income information on 28 per cent of our sample is not particularly problematic 
provided that (a) we have retained a sufficient amount of observations that 
enables us to generate reliable estimates and (b) the pattern of non-response is 
relatively random with respect to the underlying population of employees. While 
we observe some variation in those responding to the wage question by broad 
demographic characteristics, specifically males were less likely to answer (see 
Appendix Table A1), a simple linear probability model of non-response suggests 
that differences in the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents 
explain only 2 per cent of the observed non-response rate. This suggests that the 
subset of employees who provided wage decile information do not vary 
substantively from non-respondents.  
In terms of the sample of employees that have provided information on income 
decile, over 96 per cent also provided information on hours worked. However, 
closer examination of the data reveals that the response rate on hours varied by 
income decile; specifically, the non-response rate was higher within the lower 
income deciles, which will also tend to contain high proportions of individuals 
who are either in receipt of the minimum wage and/or work relatively low hours. 
Table 1 demonstrates that the rate of non-response with respect to hours falls 
from almost 10 per cent in the first decile to below 3 per cent in the fifth decile 
and above. The pattern of non-response suggests that our treatment group is 
likely to under-represent minimum wage employees who work low hours. Given 
that the control group will tend to be more heavily represented within the higher 
deciles, it is unlikely that this group’s composition will be heavily affected by the 
missing hours’ information. In a later section we check the robustness of our 
estimates to this issue by re-estimating our model on a dataset that replaces the 
missing observations of hours worked with imputed values. 
TABLE 1 NON-RESPONSE OF USUAL HOURS DATA BY INCOME DECILE 2015/2016 
Decile Mean N 
1 0.097 2,389 
2 0.071 3,600 
3 0.054 2,785 
4 0.047 3,352 
5 0.030 3,915 
6 0.020 4,290 
7 0.021 4,750 
8 0.021 4,131 
9 0.018 3,529 
10 0.024 2,324 
Total 0.037 35,065 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016.
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SECTION 3 
Our identification strategy 
Using the information available in the QNHS, we identify minimum wage and 
non-minimum wage workers as follows. Let minincome and maxincome denote 
the lower and upper wage levels respectively of the individual’s wage decile. For 
instance, in 2016, the bottom decile of monthly wages ranges from €0 to €631. 
We calculate a variable called calcminwage which represents what the 
individual’s gross monthly income would be if they were on the minimum wage 
based on the number of hours that they work. This is based on usual hours 
worked which is provided in the QNHS, such that, calcminwage = (hoursworked x 
€9.15) x 4.3. For example, the monthly pay of an individual working 25 hours per 
week and earning the minimum wage would be 25*€9.15*4.3. Based on these 
variables, we know that an individual is not a minimum wage worker if 
minincome > calcminwage, i.e., if their lowest possible take home pay exceeds 
what their gross income would be if they were on the minimum wage given the 
number of hours that they work. Table 2 below shows some examples of 
individuals in the data who are categorised as non-minimum wage workers.  
TABLE 2 EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUALS CATEGORISED AS NON-MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS 
Decile Hours worked minincome calcminwage Minimum wage worker 
7 (€2,124 - €2,431) 40 €2,124 €1,573.80 No 
5 (€1,497 - €1,792) 25 €1,497 €983.63 No 
3 (€992 - €1,280) 20 €992 €786.90 No 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
To identify minimum wage workers, we compare an individual’s highest possible 
take home pay to what they would be earning (gross) if they were on the 
minimum wage. We categorise an individual as a minimum wage worker if 
maxincome ≤ (calcminwage*1.1), i.e. if their maximum possible take home pay is 
less than or equal to what they would be earning (gross) if they were on the 
minimum wage. We introduce a degree of flexibility by adding 10 per cent to 
calcminwage due to the fact that we are estimating calcminwage based on usual 
hours worked and using a person’s maximum possible wage as a guide to their 
actual wage.3 Therefore, it is likely that individuals whose calcminwage just 
barely falls short of their maxincome are minimum wage workers and therefore 
3 We carry out some sensitivity analysis by varying the 10 per cent flexibility rule. Specifically, we use calcminwage*1.2 
and calcminwage*1 and find the results are robust to these alternative measures.  
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should be included. Our categorisation of minimum wage workers is relatively 
strict given that we are using maxincome to identify their wage and it is likely that 
the actual take home pay of most workers will be lower than the maximum level 
in their decile. For example an individual working 25 hours in Decile 2, which in 
2016 runs from €632 to €991, would have a maximum monthly take home pay of 
€991, which is then compared to €1,081, i.e., the gross earnings of a worker 
employed for 25 hours on the minimum wage of €9.15 per hour (+10 per cent). In 
this case, the individual would be categorised as a minimum wage worker as their 
maximum monthly pay is approximately equal to the monthly income of a 
minimum wage worker given the number of hours that they work. Table 3 below 
shows some examples of individuals in the data who are categorised as minimum 
wage workers. 
 
TABLE 3 EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUALS CATEGORISED AS MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS 
Decile Hours worked maxincome calcminwage (+10%) 
Minimum wage 
worker 
1 (€0 - €631) 15 €631 €649 Yes 
2 (€632 - €991) 30 €991 €1,298 Yes 
4 (€1,281 - €1,496) 39 €1,496 €1,688 Yes 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Note that we are comparing take home pay (minincome and maxincome) with a 
hypothetical value of gross pay (calcminwage) based on the number of hours that 
a person works. This does not impact our identification of non-minimum wage 
workers other than strengthening our assertion that these workers are definitely 
not minimum wage workers, as their lowest possible take home pay exceeds 
their hypothetical gross minimum wage. For minimum wage workers, this is also 
not problematic. In general, the take home pay of minimum wage workers is 
close to or equal to their gross wage. For example, a person on the minimum 
wage working 27 hours per week will have take home pay equal to their gross 
pay.4 There will be slight differences for hours above this, however, note again 
that we are using maxincome to identify these workers, most of which will have 
take home pay less than this level. Despite this, it is likely that we will also 
capture some low paid individuals whose hourly wage slightly exceeds the 
minimum. However, some studies have documented spill-over effects to these 
types of workers from a minimum wage increase, and existing studies often 
estimate the impact on the hours worked of low paid individuals, as opposed to 
just minimum wage workers (see e.g., Stewart and Swaffield, 2008). 
 
                                                          
 
4  The yearly income of this person is (27 * €9.15)*52 = €12,846.60. Plugging this figure into the Deloitte tax calculator 
shows that a person on this wage has a gross income equal to their net income; 
http://services.deloitte.ie/tc/Results.aspx. 
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Individuals in the treatment group possess characteristics that have been shown 
in previous research to be associated with minimum wage workers. In Appendix 
Table A2 we show the results of a linear probability model where the dependent 
variable equals one if the person is identified as a MW worker and zero if 
identified as a non-MW worker. The results indicate that males, Irish, older 
people, those with high levels of education and those with children are less likely 
to be minimum wage workers; individuals working in the accommodation and 
food or wholesale and retail services sectors and part-time workers are more 
likely to be minimum wage workers. Furthermore, in Appendix Table A3, we show 
the distribution of MW and non-MW workers by wage decile. It is clear that 
individuals in the treatment group (our MW workers) are concentrated in low 
wage deciles, whereas individuals in the control group (our non-MW workers) are 
concentrated in higher wage deciles. 
3.1 LIMITATIONS OF THE APPROACH  
The QNHS data contain hours and decile information on 33,760 employees, of 
which we can allocate 28,511 (84 per cent) to either a treatment or control 
group. However, a limitation of the approach relates to our inability to allocate 
5,249 employees (16 per cent of the sample). Due to the large width of the 
lowest wage decile, we cannot assign individuals working very low hours, 
specifically less than 15 hours per week, to the treatment group. For example, a 
minimum wage employee working ten usual hours per week at a wage level of 
€9.15 per hour will have a monthly salary of €393.45. However, as this falls within 
the first decile, which ranges from 0 to €631, we cannot assign any minimum 
wage individuals working ten hours to the treatment group as maxincome > 
(calcminwage*1.1).5 The problem persists for individuals working up to 14 hours 
per week in Decile 1, as the calculated minimum wage also lies below the upper 
income range in the first decile. We cannot simply assume that all first decile 
individuals working up to 15 hours per week belong to the treatment group as, 
for instance, an individual working ten hours could earn €13 per hour and still fall 
within the first income decile. These types of employees account for 26 per cent 
of the 5,249 unassignable workers.  
 
A similar issue arises in some of the higher deciles, where we are unable to assign 
certain individuals to either a treatment or control group. For example, the 
income band in Decile 2 is €632-€991, which means we cannot allocate 
employees working 20 hours in Decile 2 to the treatment or control group, as 
their maxincome (€991) > calcminwage*1.1 (€866) > minincome (€632). Similarly, 
in Decile 5, where the income range is €1,497-€1,792, we cannot allocate 
 
                                                          
 
5  The income deciles are set by the CSO and are subject to revision. From 2015-2016, the period used to study the 
effect of the minimum wage change, the wage bands were relatively stable. In previous years, from 2012 to the first 
half of 2014, the upper band in each of the wage deciles was approximately 15 per cent higher.  
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employees working 40 hours per week as maxincome (€1,792) > 
calcminwage*1.1 (€1,731) > minincome (€1,497). When reporting usual hours 
worked, a relatively large number of employees typically list 20 or 40 hours per 
week and therefore, in addition to the 1-14 hours group, the 20 and 40 hours 
groups represent a relatively large percentage of the unassignable employees. 
This can be seen in Table 4 below which shows the distribution of the 5,249 
unassignable employees by decile and hours worked.  
 
TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF THE ASSIGNABLE WORKERS 
Decile Hours range Unassignable employees (%) 
1 1-14 26 
2 17-22 33 
3 26-29 3 
4 33-34 1 
5 39-40 37 
6 46-49 1 
7 54-55 0 
8 65 0 
9 80 0 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
It is important to note that our analysis does not exclude the employees working 
in the hours ranges shown in Table 4. For example, while we cannot assign 
employees working 1-14 hours in Decile 1 to the treatment group, an employee 
whose hours fall within this range in higher deciles can be allocated to the control 
group. Similarly, while we cannot assign an individual working 17 hours in Decile 
2, an individual working 17 hours in Decile 1 would be assigned to the treatment 
group while an individual working 17 hours in a higher decile would be assigned 
to the control group. Nonetheless, if the unassignable employees in Deciles 1 and 
2 are disproportionately made up of minimum wage workers, then their exclusion 
will result in a slightly higher average hours worked of minimum wage workers in 
our sample relative to the total population. If the individuals working 39-40 hours 
in Decile 5 are disproportionately non-minimum wage workers, then their 
exclusion will lead to a slight reduction in the average hours worked of the non-
minimum wage workers in our sample. These two effects will have an equalising 
impact on the average hours worked of both treatment and control groups, 
making the average hours worked of minimum wage and non-minimum wage 
workers in our sample quite similar.  
 
Out of the sample of 28,511 employees, 4,621 (or 16 per cent) are allocated into 
the treatment group. Maître et al. (2016), using the Irish Survey of Income and 
Living Conditions (SILC) dataset, estimates that 14 per cent of individuals earn 
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below €10 per hour. As we are assigning individuals to the treatment group using 
a threshold of €9.15 + 10 per cent, this equates to a wage of €10.06 per hour and, 
as such, our estimate is broadly in line with that of Maître et al. (2016). 
 
Table 5 compares the distribution of our 2015 and 2016 treatment and control 
groups by hours worked with a comparable distribution based on a minimum 
wage question that was included within the 2016 QHNS waves.6 It should be 
noted that both approaches use different strategies to identify both categories of 
workers (control and treatment) and that differences in the sampling approach 
can potentially result in different incidences and associated distributions. For 
example, Kelly and McGuinness (2017) show that the estimated minimum wage 
incidence in Ireland in 2009 varied from 1.9 per cent, on a measure based on 
wage estimates similar to ours, to 7.2 per cent based on a direct employee 
question which was similar to that applied in the 2016 QNHS, demonstrating that 
different individuals may be identified as minimum wage workers under 
subjective and objective estimation approaches. In addition, the new QNHS direct 
question contains a very high percentage of proxy responses which could impact 
the estimated incidence of minimum wage employment using this measure.  
 
Notwithstanding the different measurement approach and the truncated nature 
of our sample data, the distribution of our treatment group by hours worked 
does not seem unreasonable. Under both measurement approaches the 
incidence of the minimum wage fell between the 20-29 and 30-34 hours 
categories, then increased in the 35-39 hour category, before declining 
consecutively in the last two hours categories. However, a better comparison can 
be made by imposing the same truncation present in our sample on the 2016 
QNHS MW distribution, which we do in the final column of Table 5.7 This shows 
that our MW sample more closely reflects that of the one reported in the QNHS; 
however our distribution has a lower share in the 20-29 hours category which, as 
discussed above (see Table 4), relates to difficulties allocating individuals working 
20 hours in Decile 2, a large proportion of which may be minimum wage workers. 
The control group distribution, unsurprisingly given the relatively small incidence 




                                                          
 
6  We use the hourly distribution of hours published in Table 8A of the Central Statistics Offices QNHS National 
Minimum Wage Series Q4 2016 (published April 2017).  
7  This is achieved by removing all observations in the 0-9 category and 50 per cent of the observations in the 10-19 
category.  
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TABLE 5 DISTRIBUTION BY HOURS WORKED OF 2015 AND 2016 TREATMENT AND CONTROL 
GROUPS USING ALTERNATIVE IDENTIFICATION APPROACHES 
Sample distribution 
2015 and 2016 QNHS distribution 2016 
MW Non-MW MW Non-MW Standardised QNHS MW 
1 to 9 0 0.6 8 1.1 0 
10 to 19 9.7 6.9 23.1 5.2 14.2 
20 to 29 14.2 16.5 26.1 11.7 32.5 
30 to 34 9.3 8.2 5.6 5.6 6.9 
35 to 39 37.3 38.3 18.4 35.7 23.0 
40 to 44 19.1 21.4 15.1 27.1 18.8 
45+ 10.3 8.2 3.7 13.5 4.6 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Note:  The sample distribution is based on the methodology of assigning minimum wage workers outlined above. The QNHS 
Distribution 2016 comes from CSO (2017). 
In light of the difficulties in allocating some individuals, we carry out a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics of these omitted workers, comparing them to the 
characteristics of employees in the treatment and control groups. We have seen 
that the unassignable employees are predominantly low-hours workers who will 
be disproportionately made up of young people, including students working part-
time, and this is reflected in the descriptive statistics.8 On average, the 
unassigned workers are relatively young, work low hours and have low levels of 
education (see Table 6). While it is true that the average characteristics of the 
unassigned workers more closely resemble those of the treatment group 
(minimum wage workers), we cannot simply assume that all of these individuals 
belong to the treatment group as it is possible that some of these could be 
earning far in excess of the minimum wage. Therefore, the benefit of our 
approach relates to the strictness of our criteria in allocating individuals to the 
treatment and control groups, i.e., we only allocate individuals for which the data 
are sufficiently clear as to whether they are minimum wage or non-minimum 
wage workers. However the cost of this approach is that we are left with a small 
percentage of our sample (16 per cent) for which we are not sufficiently 
confident as to which group they belong and therefore remain unassigned.  
8 A part-time worker is an employed person whose normal hours of work are less than those of comparable full-time 
workers. 
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TABLE 6 CHARACTERISTICS OF UNASSIGNED WORKERS COMPARED TO THE TREATMENT 
AND CONTROL GROUPS 
Characteristic Unassigned workers Treatment group Control group 
Age (in years) 41.3 39.2 42.2 
Hours worked 24.8 35.1 34.6 
Low education 24.5% 19.2% 8.9% 
Medium education 60.7% 61.3% 45.8% 
High education 14.8% 19.6% 45.3% 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
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The difference-in-differences strategy is based on estimating the change in hours 
worked for the treatment group over the two time periods and subtracting from 
this the change in hours worked of the control group over the same two periods. 
In Table 7 we show the average hours worked and incidence of part-time 
employment for the treatment group (MW workers) and the control group (non-
MW workers) in the two time periods (2015 and 2016). The first point to note is 
that while, as expected, the treatment group in both periods contains a higher 
share of part-time workers, the average hours worked in the treatment group is 
marginally higher than the control. This difference is due to the absence of data 
on minimum wage employees working very low hours in the treatment group, 
which has the effect of raising the mean value of hours worked considerably. 
From 2015 to 2016, the average hours worked of MW workers decreased from 
35.353 hours to 34.718 hours. However, over the same period, the hours worked 
of the non-MW workers increased from 34.461 hours to 34.724 hours. This is 
indicative of a potential treatment effect. 
 
To demonstrate the impact of data truncation on the samples, Table 8 looks at 
the effect of re-assigning non-assigned individuals working 10-14 hours, located 
in the first income decile, to the treatment group. While we acknowledge that 
this will incorrectly assign an unknown number of individuals, the table shows 
that were we able to accurately identify MW employees working low hours, the 
data would show the control group to have much higher average hours and a 
much lower incidence of part-time employment compared to the treatment 
group. 
 
Finally, to ensure a greater degree of comparability between our control and 
treatment groups, we exclude individuals in the 9th and 10th deciles on the basis 
that virtually no MW workers are located in these deciles. The lack of any 
treatment group members in the highest wage deciles indicates that it is not 
appropriate to include such individuals as members of the comparison group. 
Table 9 shows that, due to the fact that virtually all workers in Deciles 9 and 10 
are full-time, this exclusion has the effect of decreasing the mean hours of the 
control group, while increasing the part-time share of the control group (compare 
Table 7 to Table 9). 
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TABLE 7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MW AND NON-MW WORKERS (ALL DECILES 
INCLUDED) 
MW workers Non-MW workers 
2015 2016 2015 2016 













Part-time work (%) 26.7% 28.9% 21.2% 19.6% 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
TABLE 8 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MW AND NON-MW WORKERS WHEN WE INCLUDE 
NON-ASSIGNED PEOPLE IN DECILE 1 WITH 10-15 HOURS AS MW WORKERS (NO 
DECILE RESTRICTION) 
MW workers Non-MW workers 
2015 2016 2015 2016 













Part-time work (%) 35.8% 38.2% 21.2% 19.6% 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
TABLE 9 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MW AND NON-MW WORKERS (EXCLUDING DECILES 9 
AND 10) 
MW workers Non-MW workers 
2015 2016 2015 2016 













Part-time work (%) 26.7% 28.9% 27.2% 25.2% 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
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We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to estimate the impact of 
the increased minimum wage on hours worked. This approach is based on 
estimating the change in hours worked for the treatment group over the two 
time periods and subtracting from this the change in hours worked of the control 
group over the same two periods (hence the description of the approach as 
difference-in-differences). If the hours worked in the treatment group decreased 
by more than the control group, this may be indicative of a treatment effect.  
 
More formally, the treatment group is comprised of minimum wage workers and 
the control group is comprised of non-minimum wage workers as defined above. 
We compare the hours worked of the treatment group in 2015, before the 
increase in the minimum wage, to the hours worked in 2016, after the 
introduction of the increased minimum wage. However, this alone does not lead 
to a causal interpretation relating to the change in the minimum wage. For 
example, if we observe a reduction in hours worked for the treatment group and 
a similar reduction in hours worked for the control group, then we cannot say 
that the minimum wage change caused the hours reduction in the treatment 
group, given that the control group (of non-minimum wage workers) experienced 
a similar reduction. It is possible that a general decline in hours worked can occur 
across the labour force for reasons other than the minimum wage change. If we 
observe a reduction in hours worked for the treatment group and no reduction 
(or even an increase) in hours worked for the control group, then we attribute 
the decline in hours worked for the MW workers to the minimum wage increase. 
 
While the minimum wage increased in January 2016 from €8.65 to €9.15 per 
hour, our treatment group is any worker, in either year, who earned below the 
2016 minimum wage of €9.15. This is to capture the causal effect of the increased 
minimum wage, not only on minimum wage workers in both periods, but also on 
workers who were not MW workers in 2015 but became MW workers in 2016.  
 
The time periods cover the full years of 2015 and 2016. Including full years of 
data allows us to achieve a sufficiently large sample for the treatment group in 
order to allow for meaningful analysis. Moreover, it overcomes any issues which 
may relate to seasonal effects arising from comparing different quarters in both 
years. There are a total of 22,778 observations (see Table 10). 
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TABLE 10 NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS IN TREATMENT AND CONTROL GROUPS (BELOW 
DECILE 9) 
Year Treatment group Control group Ratio 
(treatment / control) 
2015 2,521 9,116 0.28 
2016 2,099 9,042 0.23 
 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
 
The DiD estimator (Equation 1) involves regressing the hours worked on a year 
dummy (which equals 1 if 2016 and equals 0 if 2015), a treatment dummy T 
(equals 1 for minimum wage workers and 0 for non-minimum wage workers) and 
an interaction term.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑌𝑌𝑌𝐻 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝜀 (1) 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term (β4) is the estimate of the treatment 
effect, i.e., the impact of the change in the rate of the NMW on the number of 
hours worked by minimum wage employees. It should be noted that in a 
standard MW estimation, β3 would normally be negative, indicating that the 
treatment group tend to work fewer hours than the control group; however, the 
truncated nature of our MW sample combined with our exclusion of individuals in 
the 9th and 10th decile from our control group means that in our case the 
coefficient will tend to be marginally positive. 
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SECTION 6 
Results 
The results are shown in Table 11 below. Column 1 shows the results from 
estimating Equation 1 above and Column 2 includes additional control variables 
including; age, sex, education and number of children in the home, as this may 
affect the number of hours worked. The results indicate that the increase in the 
minimum wage had a negative and statistically significant effect on the hours 
worked of minimum wage and low wage workers, with an average reduction of 
approximately one hour per week for all employees in the sample. This is similar 
to results by Stewart and Swaffield (2008) who found that the introduction of a 
minimum wage in the UK resulted in a reduction in the hours worked of low paid 
workers by between one and two hours per week. Including the controls in 
Specification 2 reduces the estimate to 0.66 hours per week, and this remains 
statistically significant. The other coefficients in Specification 2 reveal that being 
male and having higher education is associated with increased hours worked, 
while each additional child in the household reduces the weekly hours worked of 
the individual by approximately one hour.  
TABLE 11 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES RESULTS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable No additional covariates Covariates added Temporary contracts 
Treatment effect -1.054*** -0.655** -3.33***
(0.339) (0.329) (1.220) 
T 2.62*** 2.36*** 4.67*** 
(0.232) (0.229) (0.878) 
Year 0.395*** 0.331*** 0.288 
(0.137) (0.126) (0.667) 




High education 2.51*** 6.45*** 
(0.231) (0.948) 
Medium education 1.44*** 3.14*** 
(0.208) (0.888) 
No. of children -0.972*** -1.08***
(0.059) (0.271) 
Constant 32.729*** 33.960*** 24.94*** 
(0.100) (0.404) (1.50) 
Observations 22,778 22,424 1,373 
R-squared 0.009 0.150 0.1049 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (1), the variables T and Year are 
dummy variables to indicate the treatment group and treatment period respectively. 
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In Column 3 of Table 11 we focus on workers with temporary contracts. The 
effect of the increase in the minimum wage appears to have a relatively large 
effect on low paid temporary workers, with a weekly reduction of approximately 
3.5 hours.9 The large hours effect for temporary workers also appears to drive, to 
some degree, the main result for the specification including all workers. If we 
exclude temporary workers from our specification in Column 1 of Table 11, the 
coefficient reduces from -1.05 to -0.75, yet remains statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level.10 If temporary workers are excluded from the specification in 
Column 2, the estimate changes from -0.66 to -0.34 and loses statistical 
significance.11 Therefore, our results show some evidence of a decrease in hours 
for all minimum wage employees. However, the evidence of a negative hours 
effect is much stronger for minimum wage workers on temporary contracts. It 
should be noted that sub-minimum wage rates exist for certain categories of 
employees including those aged under 18, people with less than two years of 
work experience or people who are in structured training during working hours. 
The sub-minimum rate for those aged under 18, for example, was €6.41 in 2016, 
which amounts to 70 per cent of the national minimum wage.12 However, the 
incidence of sub-minimum wage employment is very low. Of all individuals on or 
below the minimum wage, 85 per cent earn the minimum wage while just 15 per 
cent earn a sub-minimum rate (CSO, 2017). Carrying out a separate analysis for 
sub-minimum wage workers is not currently possible as imposing such 
restrictions on an already limited sample size results in too few observations for 
any meaningful analysis. Moreover, the nature of our assignment mechanism to 
treatment and control groups, which is based on wage deciles, would limit our 
ability to precisely distinguish sub-minimum from minimum wage workers. As 
such, our treatment group of minimum wage workers may also include some sub-
minimum wage workers. However, these workers were also subject to an 
increase in their hourly wage, similar to minimum wage workers, and may 
therefore face similar employment and hours effects. While we cannot fully 
separate out sub-minimum wage workers, we carry out a robustness check which 
involves excluding under-18s from the analysis. According to CSO (2017), 
approximately one-quarter of sub-minimum wage workers report that the reason 
they earn a sub-minimum rate is due to being under 18. Therefore excluding 
under-18s will further limit the number of sub-minimum wage workers in our 
treatment group. Doing this makes no difference to our results. Our estimates 
remain almost unchanged in both their magnitude and statistical significance.  
 
                                                          
 
9  As noted in Section 3, our strategy for identifying minimum wage workers incorporates a degree of flexibility by 
adding 10 per cent to the calcminwage variable. We carry out sensitivity analysis by varying the degree of flexibility 
to 20 per cent and 0 per cent. The results are robust to these changes. Specifically, for 20 per cent, the coefficient for 
temporary workers is -3.31 (p-value 0.014) and for 0 per cent it is -2.60 (p-value 0.018). 
10  The p-value is 0.031. 
11  The specification which excludes temporary workers shows a decrease of 0.34 hours per week. However the 
associated p-value is 0.264. 
12  For a detailed list of sub-minimum rates, see www.lowpaycommission.ie/Rates. 
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6.1 PLACEBO TESTS 
We carry out placebo tests by estimating the model for years in which no change 
occurred in the minimum wage. If we were to observe effects similar to those 
found in Table 11 for years in which no change occurred, this would call into 
question any causal interpretation of the results in Table 11. The results of the 
placebo tests are shown in Table 12 for the following year pairings; 2012-2013, 
2013-2014 and 2014-2015.13 As we can see, the coefficient which indicates the 
treatment effect is not statistically significant in any of the years, and the sign 
fluctuates from positive to negative depending on the year. The results from the 
placebo tests support the view that increasing the NMW influenced the hours 
worked of minimum wage employees in a causal way in 2016. 
 
TABLE 12 PLACEBO TESTS 
 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
VARIABLES Pooled Temp Pooled Temp Pooled Temp 
Treatment  -0.154 -0.0907 -0.346 -1.194 0.183 0.727 
 (0.298) (0.970) (0.298) (0.992) (0.307) (1.071) 
T 2.670*** 4.655*** 2.548*** 4.724*** 2.113*** 3.949*** 
 (0.212) (0.676) (0.220) (0.705) (0.211) (0.734) 
Year 0.239** 0.371 -0.191* -0.559 -0.778*** -0.476 
 (0.0995) (0.546) (0.109) (0.582) (0.121) (0.640) 
Male 6.461*** 4.913*** 6.480*** 4.608*** 6.428*** 3.400*** 
 (0.0984) (0.469) (0.106) (0.499) (0.115) (0.543) 
Age -0.124*** -0.163*** -0.119*** -0.142*** -0.113*** -0.0451** 
 (0.00521) (0.0197) (0.00569) (0.0214) (0.00620) (0.0222) 
Medium education 0.816*** 2.874*** 0.569*** 2.158** 1.064*** 3.221*** 
 (0.164) (0.775) (0.183) (0.871) (0.197) (0.857) 
High education 2.153*** 4.601*** 2.163*** 4.905*** 2.218*** 6.355*** 
 (0.163) (0.752) (0.185) (0.869) (0.219) (0.923) 
Children -0.989*** -0.756*** -1.047*** -1.000*** -1.113*** -1.246*** 
 (0.0482) (0.226) (0.0525) (0.229) (0.0564) (0.252) 
       
Constant 35.76*** 29.79*** 35.88*** 29.66*** 35.52*** 25.21*** 
 (0.299) (1.185) (0.341) (1.374) (0.378) (1.454) 
       
Observations 32,543 2,202 27,863 1,900 24,714 1,625 
R-squared 0.160 0.134 0.161 0.124 0.159 0.101 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (1), the variables T and Year are 
 dummy variables to indicate the treatment group and treatment period respectively. 
 
                                                          
 
13  We stopped at 2011 as there was a temporary reduction on the minimum wage during this year. 
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6.2 IMPUTATION 
In order to assess the impact of the higher rate of non-response to the question 
on hours among workers in the bottom two income deciles, we imputed values 
for the missing observations based on an hours worked model that controls for 
age, gender, education, occupation and sector. The results are shown in Appendix 
Table A4. The estimated treatment effects decreased only marginally and lost 
none of their statistical significance. Moreover, the estimated values of β3, the 
coefficient associated with the group variable T, fell in all three model 
specifications as a result of slightly better data coverage among low hour 
workers. We also ran models for the placebo years using the imputation method 
(Appendix Table A5). The treatment coefficients are not statistically significant for 
any of the placebo years.  
6.3 CONTROL GROUP RESTRICTIONS 
As stated, we cannot assign individuals working 14 hours or less to the MW 
category. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model with individuals 
working less than 15 hours also removed from the control group (Appendix Table 
A6). The treatment coefficients remain negative and statistically significant. The 
treatment coefficient is not statistically significant for the placebo years 
(Appendix Table A7). 
6.4 PUSH OR PULL EFFECT? 
The detected fall in the number of hours worked among the treatment group can 
potentially be driven by at least two competing effects, (a) employers reducing 
the hours of individuals in receipt of the NMW in response to increased costs or 
(b) an increase in the proportion of individuals choosing to work part-time as a 
consequence of the higher rate of pay.14 While we cannot measure the 
competing strength of both effects, we can use our estimation approach to assess 
if the change in the MW rate was associated with a higher increase in PT 
employment among the treatment group and examine any change in the motives 
of individuals working part-time over the period.  
 
Table 13 shows the results of a difference-in-differences model on part-time 
employment, as opposed to hours worked. While the dependent variable is a 
binary indicator of part-time status, we show results for a linear probability 
model. The interaction term in a probit model is not interpretable in the same 
way as a standard linear regression, which can make it difficult to interpret the 
 
                                                          
 
14  Specifically, the increased NMW rate will have met the reservation wage of individuals considering part-time 
employment.  
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difference-in-differences estimate.15 The results indicate that the incidence of PT 
employment increased by approximately 3 percentage points more in the 
treatment group compared to the control group following the increase in the 
MW. The increase in the incidence of part-time employment was approximately 
15 percentage points higher among temporary MW workers relative to non-MW 
temporary workers. This model again passes all placebo tests for 2012-2013, 
2013-2014 and 2014-2015, suggesting that the 2016 increase in the NMW rate 
exerted a positive causal influence on the rate of part-time employment.  
 
TABLE 13 PART-TIME DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES WITH DECILE RESTRICTION (LINEAR 
PROBABILITY MODEL) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Part-time Part-time Part-time 
Treatment effect 0.0425*** 0.0265* 0.140** 
 (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0553) 
T -0.00527 -0.00402 -0.0650* 
 (0.00996) (0.00997) (0.0384) 
Year -0.0199*** -0.0165*** -0.0129 
 (0.00652) (0.00610) (0.0307) 
Male  -0.223*** -0.106*** 
  (0.00538) (0.0268) 
Age  0.00445*** 0.00448*** 
  (0.000292) (0.00108) 
Medium education  -0.0877*** -0.132*** 
  (0.00972) (0.0407) 
High education  -0.193*** -0.353*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0430) 
Children  0.0548*** 0.0494*** 
  (0.00282) (0.0132) 
Constant 0.272*** 0.236*** 0.526*** 
 (0.00466) (0.0182) (0.0683) 
Observations 22,778 22,424 1,373 
R-squared 0.001 0.114 0.113 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (1), the variables T and Year are 
 dummy variables to indicate the treatment group and treatment period respectively. 
 
Table 14 indicates that the incidence of involuntary PT work (could not find a FT 
job) fell in both the control and treatment groups between 2015 and 2016, with 
the overall magnitude of the decline being higher in the treatment group 
compared to the control group. Consequently, we cannot discount the possibility 
that incentive effects, whereby more individuals were choosing to work part-time 
 
                                                          
 
15  See Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012) for a detailed analysis of interaction terms in non-linear models. However, in our 
analysis, a probit model generates almost identical results (available from the authors). 
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by virtue of the increase in the MW, were a factor in explaining the reduction in 
average hours worked among MW workers following the increase in the 
minimum wage. 
 
TABLE 14 REPORTED REASONS FOR WORKING PART-TIME 2015 / 2016 
 MW workers Non-MW workers 
Reason 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Education / training 12.01 14.36 2.88 4.29 
Illness 1.72 0.69 1.88 1.49 
Caring for children 18.10 17.30 31.68 30.71 
Personal / family reasons 18.25 25.95 26.70 34.91 
Could not find FT job 45.40 34.26 27.75 20.37 
Other 4.52 7.44 9.11 8.22 
 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
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In order to assess the impact of the minimum wage on employment, we exploit 
the longitudinal nature of the QNHS to measure the extent to which the rate of 
relative job loss among low waged individuals, who were observed in the data in 
both Quarters 4 and 1, increased in the period following the increase in the NMW 
in 2016.16 Due to attrition rates and the fact that we are conditioning on just two 
quarters of data means that our sample sizes are relatively small. This becomes 
particularly problematic as we move beyond Quarter 1 as more individuals are 
dropped from consecutive samples. As such, we report the results comparing 
Quarter 4 to Quarter 1.17 However, the findings of Meer and West (2016), who 
use US data over the period 1975-2012, suggest that that the minimum wage will 
impact employment over time through changes in growth rather than an 
immediate drop in relative employment levels. This type of long run analysis is 
beyond the scope of the current paper and as such, we cannot discount the 
possibility of longer term employment effects. 
 
A job loss dummy variable is created which equals one if the individual was in 
employment in Quarter 4 and unemployed or inactive in Quarter 1. There will 
likely be seasonal effects from Quarter 4 to Quarter 1 which will impact low wage 
workers differently to high wage workers. For example, some low wage workers 
may be employed on temporary contracts to cover the Christmas period (Quarter 
4) and will lose this job in January (Quarter 1). Therefore, we cannot simply 
compare the rate of job loss of low wage workers with that of high wage workers 
as there may be seasonal differences which have nothing to do with the 
minimum wage. To overcome this seasonality, we compare the difference in job 
loss rates in Q4 2015 – Q1 2016 between low and high wage workers, to the 
difference in job loss rates for the same quarters in previous years. For example, 
if we observe a high job loss rate among low wage workers relative to high wage 
workers for the treatment period, Q4 2015 – Q1 2016, and observe similar sized 
differences in previous years, for example Q4 2014 – Q1 2015, then this may be 
due to seasonal effects as opposed to employment effects relating to the 
minimum wage. However, if the higher rate of job loss for low wage workers in 
Q1 2016 exceeds that of previous periods (e.g., Q1 2013, Q1 2014 and Q1 2015) 
then this would indicate a causal employment effect relating to the minimum 
wage. 
 
                                                          
 
16  It should be noted that this job loss could be either voluntary or involuntary. 
17  We extended our analysis to Quarter 2 and found similar results. We do not extend the analysis beyond Quarter 2 as 
the sample size becomes too small. 
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We examine the employment effect using the following three definitions of low 
pay versus higher pay; 
• Employees in ISCO 5 (sales and protective services) compared to employees 
in ISCO 1-4 (managers, professionals, associate professionals, clerical 
workers). 
• Employees in Decile 1 compared to employees in Deciles 2 to 10. 
• Minimum wage workers compared to non-minimum wage workers based on 
our assignment methodology outlined earlier in the paper. 
 
While it is true that the first two categories broadly reflect low paid and non-low 
paid workers, the categorisation is not precise; specifically, there will be 
individuals on relatively high rates of hourly pay in both ISCO 5 and in Decile 1. As 
such, we consider the third comparison, minimum wage to non-minimum wage 
workers, as representing the most accurate measure of the policy change on 
employment outcomes. Descriptive evidence from Q4 / Q1 comparisons over the 
period 2012 to 2016, Tables 15a-15c, indicates that the rate of job loss was higher 
among each of the low paid groups in all periods. For instance, between Q4 2012 
and Q1 2013 4.79 per cent of ISCO 5 employees became unemployed or inactive 
compared to 2.05 per cent of workers in ISCO 1-4, a difference of 2.74 per cent. 
The key question for our analysis relates to whether the rate of employment loss 
increased in a significant way after the introduction of the higher NMW rate in Q1 
2016? The descriptive evidence is somewhat inconclusive in that while the rate of 
relative job loss among the low income groups did appear to increase in Q4 2015 
to Q1 2016, relative to the difference that occurred a year earlier, the rate does 
not look dissimilar to others which occurred in other periods prior to the rate 
change. 
 
We test formally, again using a difference-in-differences model, whether the 
increase in the rate of job loss among low waged workers was significantly higher 
in the period following the introduction on the NMW increase (Q4 2015 to Q1 
2016) compared to the same period in the years preceding the change.18 To 
estimate the difference-in-differences model, we run the following regression, 
𝐿𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐿 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽22016 + 𝛽3𝑇 + 𝛽42016 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝜀   (2) 
where LostJob is a dummy variable which equals one if a person is employed in 
Quarter 4 and unemployed or inactive in Quarter 1, and zero if the person is 
 
                                                          
 
18  One could take the same approach to look at hours worked, by replacing job loss with changes in hours worked as 
the dependent variable. However, this would address a different question to the one examined in this paper, as it 
would focus on changes in hours worked of MW workers who were working in both periods. As such, it ignores any 
structural employment changes relating to new employees. Moreover, the sample size issues mentioned earlier 
would be even more problematic as we would have to condition on MW workers who are both employed and in MW 
jobs in both periods.  
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employed in both periods. The variable 2016 is a dummy variable which equals 
one for the period Quarter 4 2015 to Quarter 1 2016, and zero for previous time 
periods. The variable T is a treatment dummy which equals one if the person is a 
minimum wage / low paid worker and zero otherwise. Finally, 2016*T, which is 
an interaction term between the time and treatment dummy variables, gives the 
estimated treatment effect. 
 
The results for the three alternative definitions of low pay are shown in Tables 
16a-16c. The difference-in-differences result essentially tests whether the 
averages shown in Tables 15a-15c are statistically significantly different. For 
example the coefficient in Column 1 of Table 16a of 0.0146 is equal to the 
difference between the two statistics in Table 15b (6.40-4.94=1.46). 
 
The results show a statistically significant positive treatment effect only for the 
model comparing ISCO 5 and ISCO 1-4 workers in 2016 to the previous two years 
(2015 and 2014). No treatment effect was detected in the model comparing 
Decile 1 workers with those in Deciles 2 to 10 or in the three MW models. In 
total, only two of the nine coefficients are statistically significant. However, if we 
estimate the model for placebo years, where no MW change occurred, some of 
the results appear statistically significant. For example, in the occupation based 
model, placebo comparisons of 2015 to 2013 and 2014 to 2013 both yield 
statistically significant results. The existence of positive and significant 
coefficients in placebo periods casts doubt on the causal influence of any 
statistically significant effect found for the treatment period. In summary, there is 
no consistent evidence that the increase in the NMW rate in 2016 caused an 
increase in the proportions of such workers becoming unemployed or inactive. 
 
TABLE 15A JOB LOSS RATES FOR ISCO 5 COMPARED TO ISCO 1-4 
Time Period 
ISCO 5 – sales / protective 
services (% unemployed / 
inactive t+1) 
ISCO 1-4 – managers, 
professionals (% 
unemployed / inactive t+1) 
Difference 
Q4 2015 – Q1 2016 4.49 1.53 2.96 
Q4 2014 – Q1 2015 3.51 2.00 1.51 
Q4 2013 – Q1 2014 4.33 2.32 2.01 
Q4 2012 – Q1 2013 4.79 2.05 2.74 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
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TABLE 15B JOB LOSS RATES FOR DECILE 1 COMPARED TO DECILES 2-10 
Time Period Decile 1 workers (% unemployed / inactive t+1) 
Deciles 2-10 workers (% 
unemployed / inactive t+1) Difference 
Q4 2015 – Q1 2016 8.38 1.98 6.40 
Q4 2014 – Q1 2015 6.87 1.93 4.94 
Q4 2013 – Q1 2014 8.38 2.76 5.62 
Q4 2012 – Q1 2013 6.84 2.24 4.60 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
TABLE 15C JOB LOSS RATES FOR MW COMPARED TO NON-MW WORKERS 
Time Period MW (% unemployed / inactive t+1) 
Non-MW (% unemployed / 
inactive t+1) Difference 
Q4 2015 – Q1 2016 4.68 1.19 3.49 
Q4 2014 – Q1 2015 3.85 1.49 2.21 
Q4 2013 – Q1 2014 5.39 1.69 3.70 
Q4 2012 – Q1 2013 2.76 1.66 1.52 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
TABLE 16A DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EMPLOYMENT RESULTS: Q1 2015 AND Q1 2016 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Bottom decile model Occupation
19 model MW model 
Treatment effect 0.0146 0.0144*** .0128 
(0.0157) (0.00538) (.0103) 
T 0.0493*** 0.0152*** 0.0221*** 
(0.0103) (0.00358) (0.0068) 
2016 0.000490 -0.00461 -0.0001
(0.00431) (0.00292) (0.0043) 
Constant 0.0193*** 0.0200*** 0.0125*** 
(0.00282) (0.00195) (0.0028) 
Observations 5,475 15,852 4,447 
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.007 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (2), the variables T and 2016 are dummy 
variables to indicate the treatment group and treatment period respectively. 
19 Robust to the inclusion of control variables and robust standard errors; age, gender, education, number of children. 
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TABLE 16B DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EMPLOYMENT RESULTS: Q1 2014 AND Q1 2016 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Bottom decile model Occupation model MW model 
Treatment effect 0.00773 0.00954* -0.00216 
 (0.0161) (0.00561) (0.0112) 
T 0.0562*** 0.0200*** 0.0370*** 
 (0.00928) (0.00368) (0.00724) 
2016 -0.00772* -0.00789*** -0.00494 
 (0.00467) (0.00303) (0.00463) 
    
Constant 0.0276*** 0.0232*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.00293) (0.00200) (0.00293) 
    
Observations 6,056 16,293 4,767 
R-squared 0.010 0.005 0.009 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (2), the variables T and 2016 are dummy 
 variables to indicate the treatment group and treatment period respectively. 
 
TABLE 16C DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES EMPLOYMENT RESULTS: Q1 2013 AND Q1 2016 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Bottom decile model Occupation model MW model20 
Treatment effect 0.0180 0.00219 0.01963 
 (0.0150) (0.00561) (0.0147) 
T 0.0460*** 0.0274*** -0.0049 
 (0.00853) (0.00371) (0.0037) 
2016 -0.00259 -0.00514* 0.0152* 
 (0.00427) (0.00304) (0.0088) 
    
Constant 0.0224*** 0.0205*** 0.0168*** 
 (0.00259) (0.00203) (0.0025) 
    
Observations 6,473 15,970 5,104 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.005 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As outlined in Equation (2), the variables T and 2016 are dummy 




                                                          
 
20  Not significant with controls and robust standard errors; age, sex, education, number of children. 
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SECTION 8 
Summary 
This study uses QHNS data to assess the impact of the increase in the 
minimum wage from €8.65 to €9.15 in 2016 on the hours worked, the 
incidence of PT employment and the rate of job loss among minimum wage 
employees. Data limitations have resulted in our analysis being restricted to 
MW employees working more than 14 hours per week, as well as limiting our 
ability to allocate certain groups of employees in higher deciles, working greater 
numbers of hours, to either a treatment or control group. Specifically, the QNHS 
data contain hours and decile information on 33,760 employees, of which we 
can allocate 28,511 (84 per cent). Of the unallocated employees, 
approximately 60 per cent work 22 hours per week or less. As such, there 
may be a disproportionate number of low hourly wage workers in the 
unallocated group. Therefore, while we use strict allocation criteria, in that 
we do not allocate employees for which we are not sufficiently confident as 
to their minimum wage status, our inability to allocate a large number of low-
hours workers means that our sample may not accurately reflect the hours 
distributions of the full populations of minimum wage and non-minimum wage 
employees.  
Our results indicate that the increase in the MW in 2016 resulted in a decrease 
in hours worked for minimum wage workers. This was primarily driven by 
minimum wage workers on temporary contracts, who experienced an average 
reduction of approximately 3.5 hours per week. Our results are robust to both 
placebo tests for years where no change in the MW rate occurred, and 
various alternative specifications. 
We also test for the presence of employment effects related to the 
minimum wage increase. Both the descriptive and econometric evidence 
points to some volatility over time in the rate of job loss among low waged 
and minimum wage workers, with no consistent evidence that the increase in 
the NMW rate in 2016 caused an increase in the proportions of such workers 
becoming unemployed or inactive. 
Our results show that there was a large decrease in involuntary PT work 
(could not find a FT job) in 2015 and 2016 among minimum wage workers. 
Therefore, while observed falls in hours are generally attributed to employers 
reducing the hours of existing employees as a result of higher labour costs, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that more individuals were choosing to work 
part-time due to the 
32 | Estimating the effect of an increase in the minimum wage 
increased minimum wage. Given this, and the lack of any negative employment 
effect there is little solid evidence to support the view that the 50 cent increase in 
the national minimum wage rate that came into effect on 1 January 2016 had any 
immediate large adverse impacts on Irish workers.  
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TABLE A1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON EMPLOYEES WITH MISSING AND COMPLETE DECILE 
DATA, 2015 AND 2016 
Variable Decile data No decile data 
Age (in years) 41.63 40.02 
Male (%) 38.3 52.2 
Low education (%) 12.9 13.4 
Medium education (%) 50.5 52.4 
High education (%) 36.6 34.2 
Usual hours 33.14 34.97 
Part-time (%) 28.4 22.6 
 
Source: QNHS 2015, 2016. 
 






Medium education -0.121*** 
 (0.00896) 














Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Services relates to accommodation/food and 
 wholesale/retail. 
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TABLE A3 DISTRIBUTION OF MW AND NON-MW WORKERS BY DECILE 
Decile MW Non-MW 
1 17.12 0 
2 16.47 3.58 
3 20.39 6.51 
4 37.31 6.02 
5 4.85 6.92 
6 2.36 16.97 
7 1.23 19.14 
8 0.26 16.87 
9 0.02 14.5 
10 0 9.5 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
TABLE A4 IMPUTED HOURS MODEL 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable No additional covariates Covariates added Temporary contracts 
Treatment effect -0.952*** -0.579* -3.127*** 
 (0.329) (0.319) (1.110) 
T 2.103*** 1.927*** 3.502*** 
 (0.226) (0.222) (0.810) 
Year 0.366*** 0.287** 0.176 
 (0.136) (0.125) (0.644) 
Male  6.397*** 3.938*** 
  (0.123) (0.558) 
Age  -0.0954*** -0.0573*** 
  (0.00641) (0.0218) 
Medium education  1.547*** 2.959*** 
  (0.204) (0.790) 
High education  2.719*** 6.416*** 
  (0.227) (0.858) 
No. of children  -0.924*** -0.977*** 
  (0.0577) (0.259) 
Constant 32.66*** 33.35*** 24.79*** 
 (0.0971) (0.396) (1.357) 
    
Observations 23,697 23,325 1,531 
R-squared 0.005 0.143 0.095 
 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey. 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A5 IMPUTED HOURS PLACEBO TESTS 
2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
Variable Pooled Temp Pooled Temp Pooled Temp 
Treatment -0.173 0.293 0.0560 -1.699* 0.215 -0.235
(0.243) (0.864) (0.327) (0.950) (0.476) (1.226) 
T 2.548*** 4.238*** 1.130*** 2.497*** 0.993*** 0.707 
(0.171) (0.614) (0.214) (0.669) (0.254) (0.710) 
Year 0.150 -0.334 0.242** 0.646 -0.306*** 0.582 
(0.104) (0.539) (0.104) (0.536) (0.109) (0.567) 
Male 6.918*** 4.959*** 6.567*** 4.951*** 6.308*** 3.872*** 
(0.0969) (0.455) (0.104) (0.481) (0.110) (0.517) 
Age -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.120*** -0.134*** -0.126*** -0.0880***
(0.00518) (0.0201) (0.00550) (0.0207) (0.00586) (0.0228) 
Medium 
education 0.920*** 2.356*** 0.372** 1.743** 0.767*** 2.069** 
(0.162) (0.696) (0.178) (0.794) (0.188) (0.810) 
High 
education 2.816*** 5.422*** 1.993*** 4.473*** 1.566*** 4.583*** 
(0.162) (0.660) (0.179) (0.783) (0.208) (0.892) 
Children -0.937*** -0.900*** -1.056*** -1.101*** -1.131*** -1.309***
(0.0477) (0.204) (0.0514) (0.216) (0.0540) (0.231) 
Constant 33.99*** 26.86*** 35.89*** 29.19*** 36.77*** 28.79*** 
(0.302) (1.187) (0.331) (1.321) (0.353) (1.419) 
Observations 34,061 2,494 29,624 2,153 26,229 1,778 
R-squared 0.170 0.132 0.155 0.105 0.151 0.081 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A6 OVER 14 HOURS RESTRICTION RESULTS: 2015-2016 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable No additional covariates Covariates added 
Temporary 
contracts 
Treatment effect -0.898*** -0.542* -3.342***
(0.336) (0.325) (1.198) 
T 1.851*** 1.724*** 3.508*** 
(0.230) (0.226) (0.860) 
Full 2016 0.239* 0.204* 0.256 
(0.128) (0.117) (0.627) 




Medium education 1.192*** 3.681*** 
(0.200) (0.888) 




Constant 33.50*** 34.05*** 24.86*** 
(0.0911) (0.382) (1.473) 
Observations 22,228 21,883 1,307 
R-squared 0.005 0.145 0.099 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A7 OVER 14 HOURS RESTRICTION PLACEBO TESTS 
2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 
Variable Pooled Temp Pooled Temp Pooled Temp 
Treatment -0.186 0.377 0.0225 -1.370 0.764 0.472 
(0.240) (0.898) (0.334) (1.018) (0.505) (1.422) 
T 2.961*** 4.436*** 1.867*** 3.080*** 1.729*** 1.657** 
(0.169) (0.647) (0.218) (0.710) (0.260) (0.769) 
Year 0.238** -0.175 0.149 0.0785 -0.326*** 0.305 
(0.0981) (0.532) (0.0976) (0.523) (0.102) (0.550) 
Male 6.184*** 4.435*** 5.889*** 4.142*** 5.722*** 2.987*** 
(0.0935) (0.462) (0.0997) (0.490) (0.104) (0.527) 
Age -0.0991*** -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.139*** -0.109*** -0.0696***
(0.00499) (0.0229) (0.00528) (0.0236) (0.00553) (0.0250) 
Medium education 0.732*** 2.554*** 0.306* 2.205** 0.464** 2.982*** 
(0.159) (0.767) (0.173) (0.875) (0.182) (0.891) 
High education 2.330*** 5.522*** 1.695*** 4.877*** 1.247*** 5.249*** 
(0.158) (0.708) (0.173) (0.853) (0.199) (0.948) 
Children -0.912*** -0.881*** -0.994*** -0.999*** -1.070*** -1.286***
(0.0462) (0.220) (0.0495) (0.227) (0.0520) (0.230) 
Constant 34.92*** 29.04*** 36.63*** 31.38*** 37.23*** 29.33*** 
(0.290) (1.309) (0.318) (1.457) (0.334) (1.503) 
Observations 31,237 2,037 27,377 1,770 24,497 1,491 
R-squared 0.170 0.148 0.154 0.113 0.151 0.079 
Source: Quarterly National Household Survey.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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